This paper develops a growth model with land and housing services that explains much of the amplitude and timing of medium frequency house price ‡uctuations over the last forty years. House prices are predicted to have a "bubbly" appearance, with housing wealth rising faster than income for an extended period before collapsing and experiencing an extended decline. The analysis suggests that the current downturn in the housing sector was triggered by a productivity slowdown that began in 2004. One implication of this …nding is that policies aimed at a¤ecting house prices through credit market interventions are likely to have only a modest impact.
2005). More generally, it has been observed (e.g. Kahn, 2008 , Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2006 ) that the amplitude of house price variation tends to exceed that of income variation. These phenomona have been variously attributed to speculative bubbles, at least in speci…c localities (Case and Shiller, 2003) , expansions and contractions in monetary policy (Iacoviello and Neri, 2006) , or to changing credit market frictions-innovations such as new types of mortgage instruments, or breakdowns such as the recent subprime mortgage crisis. Such explanations suggest that market imperfections, credit market frictions, or irrationality may have played an important role in housing sector ‡uctuations.
This paper argues that a substantial portion of this medium-term variation in house prices can be explained by fundamentals-speci…cally perceived changes in trend productivity growth. It develops a stochastic growth model in which land, capital, and labor are inputs to production, and housing and non-housing consumption provide utility to consumers. Technical progress in output other than housing services is presumed to have a Markov regime-switching component as in Kahn and Rich (2007, hereafter KR) . The calibrated model, together with a plausible learning process for trend productivity, can explain the qualitative-and much of the quantitative-behavior of housing prices since the 1960s, including the recent slowdown. In particular, it shows that the regime-switching behavior of productivity growth, which KR …nds to be an accurate depiction of postwar data, can give housing prices a "bubbly"appearance in which housing wealth rises faster than income for an extended period, then collapses and experiences an extended decline. The model also provides a partial rationale for the beliefs of investors (and mortgage issuers) in the housing boom in the early part of this decade, as it suggests that the bust that occurred was a low-probability event viewed from the perspective of the early part of the decade.
A key parameter turns out to be the elasticity of substitution between housing and nonhousing consumption. This parameter has been featured in many studies related to housing (e.g. Li et al, 2008; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007; Flavin and Nakagawa, 2008.) . At the same time, many studies of housing have assumed, presumably for convenience, a value of one for this elasticity (e.g. Iacoviello and Neri, 2006) . We provide evidence based on both aggregate and microeconomic data that this elasticity is considerably less than one. This low elasticity plays a crucial role in the model's ability to explain both qualitatively and quantitatively the magnitude of housing price ‡uctuations. In particular it helps to account for a "multiplier"e¤ect that changes in housing price growth rates tends to magnify changes in underlying economic growth. Kahn (2008) …nds this multiplier e¤ect in international panel data as well.
Beyond the recent boom and bust, there is a more general view that credit market frictions play an important role in house price ‡uctuations. This paper does not directly refute that view, as it has no such frictions in the model; rather, it can be viewed as providing a benchmark for the behavior of house prices in the absence of frictions and bubbles. The results suggest that even a relatively "bare bones"growth model can account for an important part of the medium-term variation in house prices, and therefore sharply limits the role of …nancial frictions or other nonfundamentals-arguably to more transitory price volatility, or to other phenomena such as ‡uctuations in ownership rates, transactions rates, foreclosures, and the like. Figure 1 depicts the behavior of in ‡ation-adjusted housing prices over the last few decades, according to several popular series. The one available going back the farthest (to 1963 ) is the quality-adjusted price index for new homes, published by the Census Bureau. An index of existing home prices based on repeat sales 1 is available quarterly back to 1975, while the Case-Shiller index, also based on repeat sales, goes back to 1987. We can see that where they overlap, the series behave similarly except for having di¤erent trends. Both the Census and OFHEO indexes peak in 1979 or so, then decline until the mid-1980s. All three series have another small peak at around 1990, followed by ‡at or declining real prices until the second half of the 1990s. Then all three series take o¤ and increase dramatically through 2006 before turning down. The real value of housing wealth, as measured by ‡ow of funds data, has grown an average of 4.6 percent since 1952. This compares with 3.4 percent growth of private net worth excluding real estate, and 3.5 percent growth of personal consumption expenditures over the same time period. Figure 2 plots the ratio of nominal housing wealth to nominal consumption expenditure. This ratio has increase by more than 50 percent since 1952. Figure 3 plots the much more volatile ratio of housing wealth to total net worth. While the enormous volatility of non-real estate wealth (mostly the stock market) hinders precise inferences about relative trends, the upward drift of this ratio is apparent, and not just the result of the runup in real estate wealth over the last decade . The bottom line is that real estate went from 27 percent of net worth in 1952 to 39 percent by 2008. 2 One possible explanation for the relative increase in housing prices and asset values is a simple income e¤ect, or non-homogeneity in preferences. As people get wealthier, they may prefer to have more of their consumption coming from housing services, the price of which will tend to rise because of its being relatively intensive in land, a …xed factor. The (nominal) share of housing services in GDP has gone from 7.5 percent in 1952 to over 10 percent in 2005. The share of housing services in consumer expenditures has gone from 12.2 percent to 14.6 percent over the same period, but in fact has been without any meaningful trend since 1960 or so. In any case, evidence against this proposition will be presented below. Another driver of housing prices could be di¤ering technical progress trends in housing services versus other goods, as in Baumol (1967) . The relatively large share of land and structures, two inputs usually thought to be less amenable to embodied technical progress, in the value of housing makes this story plausible. This paper will argue that the timing of low-frequency changes in both housing prices and productivity suggests that this mechanism is important.
Background
There is some evidence that in fact the increase in housing wealth does not stem from an increase in the value of houses per se, but rather from the increase in the value of the land upon which they are built. First, a price index that include the value of land, the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index, has increased approximately 0.75% faster than indexes that do not, such as the Census's Composite Construction Cost index, on an annual basis. Davis and Heathcote (2004) compute a land price index based on this type of di¤erential and …nd that land values have increased at an average annual rate of approximately 3.5% (in ‡ation-adjusted) over the period . That price index may, however, have an upward bias from not adequately adjusting for quality changes. Land price series available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see Figure 4 ) suggest behavior that is closer to the behavior of new home prices in Figure 1 . We focus on the Census Bureau's quality-adjusted price of new homes in part because of concern over this bias, but also because it goes back to 1963.
Finally, Figure 5 depicts the behavior of the HP-trend component of productivity growth (relative to a linear trend) over the postwar period. While its pattern is similar to lowfrequency movements in land and housing prices, the downturn in productivity clearly precedes the downturn in housing and land prices by several years. KR provide more detailed econometric estimates of a regime-switching model of the sort incorporated below into this paper, and …nd signi…cant regime changes corresponding to the shifts depicted in the …gure.
Related Literature
Research on aggregate housing prices has emphasized demographics, income trends, and government policy as fundamental drivers. In one well-known study, Mankiw and Weil (1989) argued that population demographics were the prime determinant, and predicted that prices would fall in the subsequent two decades with the maturation of the baby boom generation and resulting decline in the growth rate of the prime home-owning age group. While their prediction proved inaccurate, Martin (2005) renews the argument for an important role for demographics. Glaeser et al (2005) argues that price increases since 1970 largely re ‡ect arti…cial supply restrictions. Gyourko et al (2006) also cite inelastically supplied land as a key driver of the phenomenon they call "superstar cities." Van Nieuwerbergh and Weill (2006), however, argue that so long as there are regional markets in which such restrictions are not present, the aggregate impact of restrictions in some local markets is likely to be modest-in other words, they primarily a¤ect the cross-sectional distribution of housing prices as opposed to the aggregate. Iacoviello and Neri (2006) examine the role of monetary policy with credit market frictions.
While Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) argue that credit market frictions play an important role in house price volatility, their model has a …xed supply of housing and no rental market alternative. Kiyotaki et al (2007) …nd that credit market frictions primarily a¤ect own vs. rent decisions as opposed to prices. Piskorski and Tchistyi (2008) examine optimal mortgage lending in a setting where housing prices obey essentially the same type of regime-switching behavior assumed here, and …nd that "many features of subprime lending observed in practice are consistent with economic e¢ ciency and rationality of both borrowers and lenders,"though, as they point out, there may be negative externalities associated with massive defaults in a downturn. Case and Shiller (2003) and Himmelberg et al (2005) investigate the bubble hypothesis, looking across a large number of cities, and both suggest that the phenomenon is limited to a few localities. As with the research above on inelastic land supplies, these papers emphasize the cross-sectional variation of house prices across metropolitan areas rather than aggregate time series variation. Consistent with the approach in this paper, Attanasio et al (2005) …nd that "common causality"is an important driver of the comovement of house prices and consumption, as opposed to wealth or the collateral channels.
One important innovation in this paper is to allow for unbalanced sectoral growth. General equilibrium models with production have generally either assumed Cobb-Douglas preferences (e.g. Davis and Heathcote, 2005 , Kiyotaki et al., 2007 , Iacoviello and Neri, 2006 or have abstracted from longer-term growth issues (e.g. Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill, 2007) . This is the …rst housing model (to my knowledge) with production that features (approximately) balanced aggregate growth and systematically varying sectoral shares due to nonunit elastic preferences. The importance of this is that it is consistent with aggregate growth facts as well as with the evidence on substitution elasticities found by numerous authors (see the discussion below), and also enables the model to match the volatility of housing prices in a plausible and disciplined way. The modeling approach is based on recent work of Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
A Simple Static Model
There are two goods, c and h, each produced by combining capital and land:
where A is relative TFP in the c sector, we assume > (h is more land-intensive) and
A representative consumer has a utility function
We can examine the impact of A on equilibrium prices and quantities. It is straightforward to show that the relative price of h in units of c, denoted by p satis…es
More speci…cally, think of the measure of "houses"as corresponding to the measure of K h , each with L h =K h units of land. Now consider the impact of a once and for all increase in A. If = 1, then p moves one for one with A; while the factor proportions remain …xed in each sector, as the income and substitution e¤ects on h exactly o¤set. By contrast, if < 1, factors shift toward the h sector, both sectors become less land-intensive, and p goes up disproportionately to the increase in A. Aggregate consumption (in units of c) c + ph increases by in proportion to A. Table 1 gives some results for p and K h =L h for a doubling of A from 1 to 2, for various values of . The other parameters are as follows: ! = 0:8; = 0:7; = 0:2: For < 1, houses become less land intensive (implicitly, land becomes more expensive relative to capital), and p increases by more than one-for-one with A.
The Dynamic Model
This section presents a general equilibrium growth model that is capable of capturing the important stylized facts about housing and the economy. The model has two sectors, a "manufacturing" sector that produces non-housing related goods and services, as well as the capital (structures and durable goods) that go into housing services. A second sector uses capital, labor, and land to produce a ‡ow of housing services. The model exhibits approximately balanced aggregate growth, but with unequal growth across sectors. We then consider the behavior of the model under a regime-switching speci…cation for productivity growth in the manufacturing sector.
Firms and Consumers
Competitive …nal goods …rms produce two types of goods: A "manufactured"good Y m , and housing services Y h . Under perfect competition the …nal goods …rms make zero pro…ts and have perfectly elastic supplies of Y m and Y h at the above prices. The production functions for the two types of goods are
for j = m; h, where K j is capital allocated to j, L j is land, and N j is labor input. The goods producers rent inputs in competitive markets. In particular, capital is rented from …nal goods producers of Y m .In the j sector, the representative …rm's nominal pro…t in period t is given by
where R`and R k are nominal rental rates for land and capital respectively, and W t is the nominal wage. There are N t representative agents at time t supplying N t labor, where N is exogenous, growing exponentially at constant rate . 3 Let C denote the aggregate non-housing consumption good, and H aggregate housing services. We let c C=N and h H=N denote per capita quantities. The representative consumer solves the problem 
where t denotes total capital investment at date t, d jt nominal dividends (for simplicity assumed to be distributed in a lump-sum fashion) from the pro…ts of intermediate goods producers in sector j, b t nominal one-period discount bonds, V t the price of land at date t, and k t and`t per capita capital and land holdings at date t. The constraints re ‡ect the fact that population is growing, so that per capita stocks get de ‡ated at rate . Both k t and`t denote the sum of capital and land in both sectors. The function z (x) re ‡ects adjustment costs, which will be discussed in more detail below.
Equilibrium Growth
We assume (necessary for balanced growth) that capital's share and depreciation are the same in both sectors, but labor's share is higher in manufacturing (implying that land's share is higher in the housing sector, i.e. h > m ). Let c and h denote per capita quantities of C and H, while k;`; k i ;`h refer to per worker quantities in sector i (e.g.
e. no subscript refers to aggregates), while n it N it =N t , (i = m; h). 4 Given the assumption of perfect competition, the equilibrium is the result of maximizing U from (8) subject to aggregate resource constraints.
mt n mt +`h t n ht =`t (15)
Total land L is assumed …xed; so`t=`t 1 = (1 + ) 1 . Average technological progress in sector i, i.e. the average growth rate of A i , is denoted i (i = m; h). Note that the timing assumptions in (14) and (15) are such that while aggregate capital k is chosen one period ahead of time, and total land and labor are exogenous, for simplicity the sectoral allocations are determined contemporaneously. Note that technical progress in the h sector is unrelated to technological progress in construction. (In fact, home construction occurs in the m sector in this model.) Rather, it refers to an increase in the housing services from given stocks of K h , L h , and labor inputs N h . What this means in practice depends on exactly what the term "housing services" encompasses, and on how one measures K h . In the model it is assumed for simplicity to be indistinguishable from K m other than by its allocation to the h sector. In particular, it is assumed to have the same price as K m and C. In principle it would include both residential structures and housing service-related consumer durables (home appliances). N h would include both non-market and market labor involved in the production of housing services such housekeeping and maintenance.
The model abstracts from a number of potentially important factors. First and foremost, the housing and construction sectors are heavily a¤ected by government intervention, both via distortionary taxation and regulations. In particular, much land in the U.S. (and in most other countries as well) is neither residential nor commercial, and is either owned or heavily restricted in its use by the government. Second, there is tremendous heterogeneity in land and housing values. Land near navigable bodies of water, or ports, or along coastlines is much more valuable than land that does not have these features. Obviously this model will have nothing directly to say about the cross-sectional distribution of land values or housing prices (though many of the factors that a¤ect them over time undoubtedly come into play in the cross-section as well). Nonetheless if all of these factors remain relatively constant over time, then ignoring them in a model such as this should not be too great a sin.
The static …rst-order conditions for the problem (8) can be shown to imply that p t , the relative price of housing services in terms of manufactured goods, satis…es
Thus as in the static example, growth in the price of housing services re ‡ects both relative productivity growth in manufacturing and the increasing scarcity of land.
Aggregate Growth under Certainty
Let total expenditure c + ph be denoted by x. It also turns out that m = x 1 (see the proof in Appendix 1), hence mt = mt 1 = x t 1 =x t . We will de…ne aggregate balanced growth under certainty as an equilibrium path in which x and k both grow at a constant rate, and in which the interest rate (i.e. the marginal product of capital) is also constant. We will also assume that z (i=k) = i=k and z 0 (i=k) = 1 at the steady state value of i=k, so that adjustment costs are zero on the balanced growth path. Balanced growth clearly requires that A mt k 1 mt` m mt be constant, which amounts to a linear restriction on the growth rates in the m sector of the capital-labor ratio, technological progress, and the land-labor ratio. Therefore, let
and de…ne variables with "~" over them to be de ‡ated by Z t , e.g.k mt k mt =Z t . We then have
Withk m constant under balanced growth, k and x both grow at the same constant rate. From the resource constraints and …rst-order conditions for maximization, we can show that
Now let
where
Then we have k mt = k t 1 =Q t , and we can de…nek t k t = (Z t Q t ). This gives a normalization of k t that is constant on the balanced growth path. Note that if m = h , then Q = 1 and we would have k mt = k ht = k t 1 . But with m > h , Q > 1 and n h and n m are changing over time (unless = 1). In particular, if < 1 and m h , then n h (and hence Q) grows over time.
Thus, strictly speaking, balanced growth requires one of these knife-edge conditions:
None of these is very palatable: Below I provide evidence that is substantially less than one, and cite other studies with similar …ndings. I also show that has important implications for housing price dynamics, so assuming = 1 for convenience is not innocuous. Similar comments apply to the assumption m = h . To assume (24) is less problematic, as it is tantamount to assuming that p t is stationary. It does imply that h > m , which is hard to believe but also hard to refute directly since h is di¢ cult to measure. If (24) fails to hold (say if m h , so that p drifts higher over time), the dynamic response of the model will be a function of the level of p t -in particular the expected growth rate varies over time and is only asymptotically constant.
It turns out, however, that assuming balanced growth (that is, solving the model by approximating around a …xed point) appears to be innocuous: Both the variation in the growth rate over time and the di¤erences in dynamics are tiny. Thus when (24) does not hold, the model exhibits near-balanced aggregate growth and unbalanced sectoral dynamics, as in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) . 5 We will see below that over a wide range of parameters, growth is so close to balanced even when p is growing over time that it is reasonable to treat it as balanced for computational purposes. So the bottom line is that at least for reasonable parameters the model implies that growth is (approximately) balanced even when sectoral growth is unbalanced because p grows over time.
Under balanced growth, ZQ grows at a constant rate: In fact it is straightforward to show that its growth rate g satis…es
We then havek
output per capita (in terms of manufactured goods), which we denote y t , is A mt k t`
h ht n ht , or (after substituting for p t and simplifying as before):
so we can also de…neŷ
. We can now characterize the dynamics in terms of stationary variables:
Since along the balanced growth path G t is constant, z (x) = x, and q = 1, the aggregate economy behaves exactly as the standard neoclassical growth model. The innovation in this paper is to simultaneously characterize the behavior of sectoral variables, and in particular housing prices and investment, within the aggregate steady state. The sectoral variables can be solved for directly as functions of the aggregates. Only in the knife-edge cases of = 1 or (24) will these variables exhibit balanced growth in the sense of either being constant or growing at the same rate as the aggregate economy. (Details are provided in Appendix 1.) We can compute the shadow rental price of land, denoted t , in terms of manufactured goods:
The land rental price grows at rate g + on the balanced growth path, but at a faster rate in the near-balanced growth case in which p grows over time.
Stochastic Growth
We suppose that the growth rate of A h is …xed at h , but that of A m follows a Markov regime-switching process:
t is a transitory disturbance, and t is a state variable with Markov transition matrix , where [i; j] = Pr t = jj t 1 = i : Since the columns of must sum to one, we write it
If the diagonal elements of are close to one, the growth states will be highly persistent, and a shift from one state to the other will carry with it a sizeable adjustment in the long-term level of A m . The log deviation version of G t can be written as
We suppose that t = 1 t 1 + 2 t 1 + t , where t is i.i.d. with a zero mean. In what follows, we will …rst assume that economic agents observe both z t and t before making their period t decisions. Later we will consider the possibility that they only observe G t and must estimate z t and t given the history of G t .
Asset Prices
Thus far we have only described the behavior of the price of housing services and rental prices for land. The term "housing prices" generally refers to asset values of homes, both the structures and the land. In this model we can calculate the value of what might be called "real estate wealth," which would be the total value of capital and land allocated to the housing services sector. The value of the capital is just K h = k h n h . The asset value of the land L h =`hn h requires some computation, as described below. Given a land price, which we will denote by V t (expressed in terms of m sector output), valuing a representative house requires constructing an index, because the composition of the representative house changes over time due to changes in the price of land. Given a path fK ht ; L ht g we will de…ne a "constant-quality" house price index P ht as a Laspeyres index by choosing a base year, say t = 0, and setting
We know that V t is the present discounted value of the stream of rents f t g:
is the stochastic discount factor. On the balanced growth path we have
and t , as mentioned previously, (for plausible parameters) almost constant but technically a function of A mt =A ht and N t (for < 1 it is increasing in both arguments). Hence while the capital stock and the aggregate output grow at g + , the price of land, and hence the price of "houses"(capital plus land in the h sector) grows at a rate (slightly) faster than g + :
Calibration
Most of the parameters take on standard values for quarterly data: = 0:33, = 0:0025, = 0:02. 6 The parameters h and m should re ‡ect the shares of land in the cost of housing services and non-housing output respectively. The work of Davis and Heathcote (2004) suggests a value for h of 0.5. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics capital tables suggest a value for m of 0.05. 7 Since housing services represent about 20 percent of overall consumer expenditures, we set ! h = 0:2, ! c = 0:8, though since expenditure shares vary it is necessary to choose the starting level of A m =A h appropriately. We set the time preference rate equal to 0.01: Finally, we choose the parameters of the regime-switching process for productivity to correspond roughly to the results in KR: 
The Elasticity of Substitution between Housing and other

Consumption
The …rst-order conditions of the model imply a relationship between the expenditure ratio for housing and non-housing consumption and the relative price. 6 The choice for represents a compromise between conventional values for structures and equipment for the sake of tractability. Allowing to di¤er for K h and K m complicates the math without altering the predictions of the model in any signi…cant way. 7 Of course there is great variability across subsectors: Manufacturing has a land share of about 0.02, as do most service sectors, while wholesale and retail trade is about 0.07, and agriculture about 0.3. But weighting the various sectors by their share in GDP yields a …gure of 0.05.
The long-term behavior of aggregate expenditures on housing services suggests a unit income elasticity for such expenditures, but price inelastic (i.e. < 1). This is because the ratio expenditures on housing services to non-housing consumption expenditures has no long-run trend, but is positively correlated with the relative price of housing services, at least as measured by NIPA. Figure 6 presents annual data going back to 1929 of the two series, which show a positive relationship for most of the sample, though recently (since roughly 1990) they have diverged. The magnitude of the elasticity, however, is di¢ cult to infer from time series data, given that both the ratio and the price are endogenous variables. In addition, whereas the nominal expenditures on h and c may be measured accurately, there may be substantial error in measuring the true relative price. Whereas the Boskin Commission had estimated an upward bias in CPI rents, Gordon and van Goethem (2005) argue for a downward bias averaging roughly 0.5 percent annually, but varying over time.
As a consequence, we instead examine evidence from micro data. Speci…cally, we examine data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to gauge the extent of housing service expenditure share variability as a function the relative price of housing services. To do so we construct rent (or owner's equivalent rent) relative to other expenditures, and match this up with data on housing prices by region, total expenditures, and demographic controls. As the above condition suggests, we can obtain an estimate of by a suitable regression of the nominal expenditure ratio on relative price.
Looking at micro data solves several problems. First, it is reasonable to take the price, which is based on regional CPI measures of owner's equivalent rent relative to the CPI excluding shelter, as exogenous to individual households. Second, the price measurement issue alluded to above is arguably mitigated by reliance on relative prices across regions. Third, we can include speci…c demographic controls to account for variation in, for example,
Consider the following model for individual i at date t in region j:
Here a j re ‡ects some constant region-speci…c factor that might a¤ect expenditure shares. For example, if living in a region provides some amenities such as inexpensive public transportation or moderate weather that substitute for other expenditures (automobiles, heating oil), a j might be positive. Note that we have to assume that a j is constant over time or else we would not be able to identify the price e¤ect. The coe¢ cient b would re ‡ect a wealth e¤ect to the extent it di¤ers from zero, and the coe¢ cient on p jt has the interpretation indicated: if < 1, relative expenditures on housing services increase with their cost. The model also includes a set of demographic variables z it , which would include things like family size and number of wage-earners. Note that we would expect a negative coe¢ cient on an indicator of two adults working, as this would typically result in less household production and more expenditures on non-housing goods and services. Finally, the error term u ijt represents idiosyncratic variation in preferences for housing services (in the model represented by ! h =! c ), measurement error of the dependent variable, and other omitted variables.
If the CEX had a true panel structure we could di¤erence out the a j . We could also allow for individual …xed e¤ects. Unfortunately each individual household observation is present for at most four quarterly observations, so the panel aspect is probably useless (the other explanatory variables are not likely to change in a meaningful way over the course of a household's participation). Consequently we choose to pool the sample in levels and use regional dummies to capture the region e¤ects. We also just use one (the …rst) observation per household, to avoid giving more weight to households simply because they remain in the sample.
Another consideration is adjustment costs. Moving is costly, so many households may be passively accepting changes in their expenditure shares for a while until they decide to move. Consider an (s; S) framework in which households have …xed costs of moving. They remain where they are and simply absorb any price variation so long as the price p is between the lower and upper bounds s and S; otherwise they move and obtain a new level of expenditure ph 2 (s; S). If this is the case, we want to gauge the potential bias in estimating .
While one might think that the tendency for households to move infrequently would bias the estimate of toward zero, the results of Caplin and Spulber (1987) suggests that if p is stationary and not very persistent, and households experience idiosyncratic shocks in addition to changes in p, then households will be uniformly distributed in the interval (s; S). And if, on the other hand, p has a unit root or is trending over time and 6 = 1, (s; S) will drift along with p, but at any point in time households will still be distributed uniformly throughout the interval. Consequently the observed expenditure ratio will likely equal the "desired"or long-run ratios plus some noise. The covariance of this error with p should be zero; that is, households are just as likely to to be above as below their desired ratio. This suggests there is no compelling reason to think that the estimate of should be biased in one direction or another.
For nominal expenditures on housing services we use rent for renters and owner's equivalent rent (OER) on the primary residence for owners. 8 Consequently we subtract mortgage and home equity interest from total expenditures, as well as property taxes and expenditures on various categories of home repairs and maintenance that would normally be included in rent. We assume that OER is not intended to include utilities, so for owners utility expenditures are included in total but not housing expenditures. For renters, reported utility expenditures are also included only in total expenditures, but a dummy variable is included for renters that report zero utilities expenditures (on the assumption that they are included in rent). The results of this estimation exercise are shown in Table 2 . Because of an unexplained break in the level of the dependent variable that occurs in 1993 (presumably because of some change in variable de…nitions), all of our estimates included a dummy variable for post-1993 data. The total expenditure variable x it is likely to be measured with error. Such error would tend to produce a potentially large downward bias in the estimate of b because x it enters the denominator of the dependent variable. Fortunately, we have candidates for instruments: demographic variables such as race and education that are plausibly unrelated to the u itj . We present results with and without constraining b = 0. Imposing b = 0 results in^ = 0:284: Estimatingb with instrumental variables lowers the estimate of^ to around 0.2, though the estimate of b is a somewhat implausible 0:254. Similar estimates were obtained without the …xed region e¤ects. 9 The fact that the estimates of are relatively insensitive to the treatment of other variables in the equation provides some reassurance that it is well below one. This is consistent with a long history of studies that …nd housing demand to have a low price elasticity (e.g. Hanushek and Quigley, 1980; Polinsky and Ellwood, 1979), or other estimates of based on micro data. For example, Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) use PSID data and, taking explicit account of lumpy adjustment costs, estimate to be 0.13. Using a di¤erent methodology based on asset prices, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) set = 0.05 in their calibration. The signi…cant negative estimate of b is problematic for the assumption of homotheticity, but is hard to square with the relatively ‡at expenditure share in Figure 6 . If true it would tend to mute the e¤ects described in the simulation, as growth in the demand for housing services would not be as responsive to expected productivity growth. For this reason we will be conservative in our choice of and set it equal to 0.3 for our benchmark case.
four weeks, which we regard as something qualitatively di¤erent from housing services. 9 Without instrumenting for x, the estimate of b is an implausibly large negative number (as one would expect given that the explanatory variable is in the denominator of the dependent variable), and the estimate of is only 0.134.
Model Simulations
The unit root assumption on productivity growth necessitates gauging the evolution of the model economy when (24) does not hold. Speci…cally, suppose (1 + m ) (1 + ) h m > 1 + h so that p grows over time. We can simulate the model under constant TFP growth around …xed values ofk andx and …nd the value for g that matches the actual average growth rate of QZ (which is the growth rate of per capita capital and output) in the simulation. We then examine how much the growth rate of QZ varies over time, and what that implies for variation ink andx. If it turns out to be miniscule, then balanced growth is a good approximation and we can linearize around …xed values ofk andx in the usual way. Table 3 provides the results of this exercise for various values of h implying di¤erent average growth rates of p. The simulations were over 50 years (200 quarterly observations), using the parameters described above. The results show that even for the case in which p grows at one percent annually for 50 years (the growth rates in the table are quarterly percentages), the change in the growth rate is tiny and economically inconsequential in terms of its impact on the level of k and x.
Given these …ndings, we can separate the model conveniently into its dynamic aggregate component, which is approximately the neoclassical growth model, and the sectoral variables, which do not have a simple steady state representation, but are static functions of the aggregate state variables. The connection between the two components is in the growth rate G t , which depends on the changes in sectoral variables from t 1 to t. Thus we use standard methods (e.g. Uhlig, 1997-see Appendix 1 for more details) to obtain a solution for the linearized aggregate model. It should be noted that parameters related to the sectoral dimension of the model do not enter into this part of the problem. These include h , , h , ! c ; and ! h . For given realizations of the exogenous disturbances, time paths for the aggregates can be computed, they can be converted back to levels and become inputs to solving the for the sectoral variables (e.g. p; n m , n h , etc.) period-by-period.
The key to doing interesting simulations is to take the peculiar error structure of the disturbance process into account. Even though the conditional expectation of the errors in the z t process (the regime states) is zero, actual realizations of zero are not possible, and in fact given the values of q 1 and q 0 , a small error (of absolute value 1 q 0 or 1 q 1 ) that leaves z unchanged is highly likely in any given time period. So rather than consider a one-time shock to v, it makes sense to consider a single large shock (a regime-switch) followed by a sequence of identical small shocks that leave the regime unchanged for an extended period of time. Such a path is more like a modal outcome rather than the improbable mean. Figure 7 gives an example of this type of simulation. The economy is in the low growth regime in periods 1 to 11, and then switches to the high growth regime, where it remains.
The …gure plots the behavior of the asset price of a house (a …xed-weight combination of capital and land-see below) against per capita income, for = 0:3 and 0:9. House prices are clearly much more responsive, both at impact and during the regimes, in the = 0:3 case. When the regime shift occurs, the price jumps about 5 percent if = 0:3 versus around 2 percent if = 0:9. During the high-growth regime the growth rate of the price is about 0.5 percent (annualized) faster if = 0:3 versus = 0:9. Prices actually accelerate as long as the economy remains in the high-growth regime, the more so the lower is .
Regime Uncertainty
The model solution and simulations above assume perfect knowledge about the growth regime. This is unlikely to be a realistic assumption: Productivity growth is a very noisy process with (as we shall see. Fortunately, the framework in KR provides a natural mechanism for extracting what economic agents know about the growth regime from the behavior of other economic variables. As described in Appendix 2, it is a dynamic factor model with Markov regime-switching in the stochastic growth component. Figure 8 provides an estimate of the so-called smoothed (incorporating all available data through 2007:Q3) and zero-lag (incorporating data for each observation only up to that date) estimates of regime probabilities, incorporating information about the growth regime from data on productivity, labor compensation, aggregate consumption, and aggregate hours of work. The zero-lag estimates provide a one basis for what economic agents might have thought at the time. Note in particular the recent signs of a shift back to the low-growth regime, roughly coincident with the sudden end of the housing boom.
As an extreme benchmark, we can simulate the model under the assumption of perfect information, i.e. that agents actually observe the regime shifts and level shocks in real time. Figure 9 illustrates the behavior of housing prices according to the model under this extreme assumption, where the simulation assumes, based on Figure 8 , that regime shifts occurred in 1973, 1996, and 2004. As suggested by the discussion in the previous section, a regime shift triggers both a level and growth rate change in housing prices. Transitory shocks have relatively little impact since they are not confused with permanent shocks. Note that for these and subsequent simulations, because the linear trend depends on the unobservable h , we just assume a value for h such that the trends line up exactly, and judge the model by its ability to match deviations from the linear trend. By that standard, the perfect information assumption clearly misses on both timing and amplitude.
There are, however, three potential sources of incomplete or imperfect information. First, agents may not observe t , the persistent but transitory disturbance to A mt , separately from v t , the regime-dependent error. This is a standard inference problem addressed by Hamilton (1994) and others. As new data arrive, agents observe A mt and update their assessment of the current regime. It turns out that although this aspect of imperfect information smooths out the implied price series somewhat, the impact is limited by the fact that with full knowledge of the underlying parameters, agents can infer regime switches relatively quickly-typically within two years of when the full sample indicates the switches occurred. Consequently the resulting price series exhibits most of the ‡aws of the series under perfect information in Figure 9 , attenuated only slightly.
This sort of rational expectations updating is implausible in anything other than a stationary environment in which agents know (or have had su¢ cient time to learn) the underlying parameters of the stochastic processes. As of the early 1970s there had been no experience in the United States with a sustained productivity slowdown since the Great Depression. To believe that the low productivity growth beginning in 1973 was a change in the trend would have required vivid imagination or exceptional insight. Other than considering the experience of other countries, there would have been no realistic way to form estimates of either the alternative mean growth rate or the transition probabilities.
Thus, a second source of imperfect information is the result of agents not knowing the parameters of the productivity process. One way to approach this is to suppose that expectations are formed by estimating the regime-switching dynamic factor model in "real time"-that is, based on data only available at each point in time. 10 This is similar to least squares learning, except that there is no simple recursion to update the parameter estimates. While estimation of a regime-switching model when there is no regime switch (yet) in the data is potentially problematic, as some parameters are not identi…ed, the point in real time at which the estimation begins to detect a regime switch provides a plausible mechanism for dating when economic agents might have done so (apart from the fact that the econometric techniques had not been developed yet!) It turns out that rolling estimation of the KR model annually through the 1970s con…rms that it fails even to detect a second regime until around 1978, and only puts high probability on it in 1979 (see Figure 10a) . After that the estimation converges quickly to close to the full sample estimates. It is worth noting that 1979 is also the year when a number of studies about "the productivity slowdown" began to appear (e.g. Denison, 1979; Norsworthy et al., 1979) , though even these were primarily retrospective and did not take clear stands on how likely the slowdown was to persist. Edge et al (2007) also report that o¢ cial forecasts of long-run productivity growth drifted down slowly in the 1970s, but remained above 2 percent through 1978, and then plummeted in 1979 to 1.5 percent. Yet a third complication is illustrated by Figure 10b . Whereas the KR model estimated with data available as of the end of July 2007-recall Figure 8 -shows the current productivity slowdown beginning (with high probability) in 2004, data available prior to July 2007 had not indicated a slowdown with any substantial probability. Even as of June 2007, Figure 10b indicates that the low-growth regime probabilities were in the vicinity of 0.1. Then the benchmark revisions that came out in July 2007 revised productivity growth downward over the previous three years. Thus, in addition to the di¢ culties presented by learning the parameters of the process, and by-given the parameters-assessing the regime probabilities in real time as the data arrive, there is the third di¢ culty that the data are regularly revised. While it is possible that the downward revisions did not come as a complete surprise, it is reasonable to assume that there was signi…cant delay in recognizing the magnitude of the productivity slowdown. Hence the real-time estimates from the KR model would appear to be more realistic than the full sample estimates underlying Figure 8 .
The general equilibrium model in this paper does not have the complexity that would allow the methods of KR to be applied or simulated directly; in particular, there is only one stochastic variable, so there would be no point to dynamic factor analysis. On the other hand, using actual productivity data would result in unrealistically poor assessments of when the regime switches occurred (see KR). Instead, we construct an arti…cial productivity process as in (32) (34), imposing regime switches that correspond to those found in the data, i.e. in 1973, 1996, and 2004. For the t process we use the estimated common transitory process from the KR model, scaled so as to obtain similar regime inferences to those obtained by KR. 11 The resulting "productivity"series is then used to estimate the parameters of the process along with regime probabilities as of each date from 1963:Q1 forward. This results in a set of parameters associated with each date, which then are used to simulate the model. The only calibrated (…xed) parameters are the discount rate , the depreciation rate , and the share parameters h and m . More formally, the idea here is to assume that agents observe A mt = A mt 1 (1 +~ mt ) t = t 1 ; but whereas the true process, and accordingly the values of~ mt and t , are as described earlier, agents instead have time-varying estimates of the parameters^ 1 mt ,^ 0 mt ,^ 1t ,^ 0t , probabilities^ tjt = Pr ( t = 1j t ), and transitory terms^ sjt = E ( s j t ) where t represents data observed through period t. (We assume only that they know the production function parameters , h , and m , and the parameters of the utility function.) They obtain estimates of the parameters by using maximum likelihood (or, rather, an approximation 12 based on Kim, 1994) . At each date they update their estimates upon observing the latest realization of A mt , and revise their expectations of future exogenous and endogenous variables accordingly. In other words, by construction agents'estimates of the various components of g t add up to the actual g t , which is observed, but have di¤erent implications for expectations compared to the complete information case where the parameters are known and the shocks observed.
(See Appendix 1 for additional details) Figure 11 provides the results of the model simulation of housing prices under the realtime learning assumption, in comparison with the Census and OFHEO indexes. All series are detrended, since the model does not have any prediction about the price trend. While the model misses on the full amplitude of the price ‡uctuations, it gets most of it: The amplitude of the model's predicted price path is roughly plus or minus 10 percent relative to trend, while both the new and existing home price series get to around 15 percent above trend, and the existing home price series plunges to more than 15 percent below trend in the mid-nineties. With regard to timing, the model tends to anticipate the actual price increases, especially in the 1960s, but gets the timing of the peaks and troughs remarkably well.
Another check on the model is its predictions about investment. Clearly the lack of adjustment costs at the sectoral level will mean that sectoral investment will be excessively volatile at high frequencies. Aggregate adjustment costs appear to have little impact on this volatility: With relative price changes, the model makes it too easy to ‡ip capital from one sector to the other. Nonetheless we can still examine the model's predictions and focus on the lower frequencies of interest. Figure 12 displays the behavior of residential investment (de…ned as the change in residential capital), along with actual series. Both series are detrended, the model's by the steady state growth trend, and the data by a Hodrick-Prescott trend for real GDP. Just as the model overpredicts prices in the early part of the sample, it overpredicts residential investment as well. Overall the model hits the medium frequency movements reasonably well, albeit predicting somewhat greater mediumfrequency amplitude than is in the data. The only substantive miss after 1975 is the model's prediction of a mini-cycle in the second half of the 1990s that never occurred. This is the mirror image of the model's slightly premature prediction of a price runup beginning at the same time. It appears that the arti…cial learning that takes place in the model is a little too rapid, at least in response to favorable news.
The …nding that the model slightly underpredicts the amplitude of price ‡uctuations and overpredicts the amplitude of investment ‡uctuations is not surprising given the lack of any adjustment costs or other real frictions. In addition, the model omits demographics, which may have played some role, particularly in the early part of the sample in the wake of the baby boom: There was an explosion of family formation and residential investment following World War II, and the o¤spring in those families had for the most part not yet come of age. This may have held down both prices and investment in the 1960s and early 1970s, and boosted them in the late 1970s and 1980s and again in recent years during the "echoes"of the baby boom.
Overall, given its parsimony and simplicity, and the fact that it has only one driving force, the model explains a substantial part of both price and quantity ‡uctuations. This is noteworthy considering that the key parameters-the elasticity of substitution, the land share parameters in the production functions, and the productivity process, are calibrated either from micro data or, in the case of the productivity process, from empirical exercises that do not take the housing sector into account. Certainly there are parameters that would result in an even better …t, but the goal here was not to explain everything, only to quantify the role of changes in trend productivity.
Conclusions
This paper has developed a growth model with land, housing services, and other goods and shown that it is capable both qualitatively and quantitatively of explaining a substantial portion of the movements in housing prices and, to a lesser extent, residential investment over the past 40 years, including the recent downturn. The paper also uses micro data to calibrate a key cross-elasticity parameter that governs the relationship between productivity growth and home price appreciation. The matching of the model to the data relies not on …tting the overall trend (which depends on an unobservable), but on the deviations from that trend as a function of productivity growth. The calibrated model under rational expectations can explain some of the acceleration in housing prices that occurred both in the 1960s and since the mid-1990s, and also suggests a contributing explanation for the recent downturn, but fails to get the full amplitude and timing of the ‡uctuations. When a realistic model of learning is added in lieu of rational expectations, however, the model does much better on both. In particular, the continued boom in housing prices in the 1970s is largely explained by the time it took for agents to …gure out that the productivity slowdown was quasi-permanent. Finally, the paper also has some success in matching the low frequency behavior of housing investment, in particular the boom that began in the late 1990s. Even so, future work will incorporate adjustment costs, and other sources of shocks to capture more accurately the high frequency behavior of both prices and quantities.
Another implication of this analysis is that it sheds new light on recent subprime mortgage crisis and the ripple e¤ects on …nancial markets. If we accept the idea that the housing downturn was triggered by a productivity slowdown, and that this was a low probability event in light of what was known prior to 2007 about productivity growth, it may be that subprime mortgage lending was, ex ante, economically rational. The probability of a productivity slowdown-and therefore of a reversal in housing prices-such as the one that occurred in 1973 could reasonably have been viewed as small over the relevant horizon for mortgage lenders.. Indeed, a recent paper by Piskorski and Tchistyi (2008) makes precisely this point. They examine optimal mortgage lending in a setting where housing prices obey essentially the same type of regime-switching behavior, and …nd that "many features of subprime lending observed in practice are consistent with economic e¢ ciency and rationality of both borrowers and lenders,"though, as they point out, there may be negative externalities associated with massive defaults in a downturn.
Moreover, if indeed house prices are driven to a great extent by long-term fundamentals like productivity growth, and not so much by credit market frictions, this has important implications not just for a historical understanding of the causes of the housing bust that began in 2005, but also for policies aimed at shoring up house prices by providing foreclosure relief, subsidized mortgages, and the like. The results in this paper suggest that such policies are likely to have limited impact, since they do not a¤ect the economy's long-term growth potential. More generally, the results suggest that policies aimed at stimulating the economy by supporting house prices are getting it backwards: The best way to support house prices is to undertake policies that support long-term economic growth. Modeling the regime shift process:
Since the stationary distribution of is 
For concreteness we will call = 1 the "high-growth" regime, and = 0 the "low-growth" regime, i.e. we assume (1) process. We have
where E t 1 (v t ) = 0, and is distributed as follows:
Note that while E v t j t 1 = 0, v t is not identically distributed over time, as the conditional distribution depends on t 1 . The …rst-order conditions for the planner are as follows: Letting
we have:
mt ; ht ; and t are shadow prices on the resource constraints (11), (13) ; and (12). Note that in the absence of adjustment costs, i.e. when z (x) = x, we have t = mt ; and (48) becomes
which is just the familiar condition that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal product of capital. To solve the model, …rst we linearize the system
around the quasi-steady state valuesk,x, and G.. After some rearranging, and letting R hk =G i 1 + 1 = (1 + ) (1 + ) G, the linearized versions of the four equations can be expressed as
Note that
The log deviation version of G t can be written as
where n ht and `m t are deviations from their local means given growth at G. Thus G t re ‡ects the endogenous resource shift toward or away from the h sector in response to the shock. 13 The near-balanced growth behavior of the system means that we can appoximate the 13 Note that the unit root in productivity means that, strictly speaking, the dynamics of the model are not independent of the initial position in levels, as n h will will not be stationary. It turns out, however, that this variation is miniscule, because n h evolves slowly and the coe¢ cient on (n ht n ht 1 ) above is su¢ ciently small and insensitive to n h so that this can be neglected. growth rates of the sectoral variables by linearizing the system
(55)
in logarithmic …rst di¤erences around the values that obtain under aggregate growth of G and population growth . Here we can assume that k m and x grow at G, while h, c, n h , and`m each grow at locally constant rates, which as we have seen is a good approximation over periods of many decades. This results in a system of the form:
where s t [p t c t h t`mt n ht k mt ] 0 and m t h mt x t k t 1 0 0 i 0 , all in deviations. is 6 6 and is 6 5. The local constant growth rates can be found from The result is a system is of the form (if we neglect adjustment costs for the sake of with transition matrix (34) as described in the text. The permanent component is an autoregressive process with a unit root and a two-state Markov process for intercept. 14 The motivation for this setup is the idea that to assess something like the underlying trend in a noisy variable like output per hour, it makes sense to look at more than just that time series, since theory suggests that other series will have a common trend. Using the joint information in multiple series allows more precise assessments of regimes, both current and past.
The four series used in the analysis are non-farm output per hour, real non-farm labor compensation, real consumption expenditures normalized by hours of work in the non-farm sector, and detrended hours of work in the non-farm sector. The …rst three are cointegrated with a common factor loading on the permanent component (that is, the equations are estimated constraining a 1 = a 2 = a 3 ) while fourth variable, being detrended, has a 4 = 0. Estimation makes use of the state space representation of the above system as developed by Kim and Nelson (1998) , and yields estimates of the key parameters as described in the calibration section. It also yields estimates of the regime probabilities, following the methods of Hamilton (1994) .
For the simulations, because the model does not have the richness of the data (there is only one shock), an arti…cal productivity process is generated with actual regimes as suggested by Figure 8 (i.e. high growth through 1973, low growth from 1973-96, high growth from 1996-2004, and then low growth), but with su¢ cient noise such that the inferred regime probabilities resemble those in Figure 8 . We also feed in the estimated aggregate transitory shocks from the actual system estimation as part of the noise to the series. 
